In this paper, we use Wu et al.'s scheme as a case study and demonstrate that due to an inherent design flaw in Zhu-Ma's scheme, the latter and its successors are unlikely to provide anonymity. We hope that by identifying this design flaw, similar structural mistakes can be avoided in future designs.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
IRELESS communications technologies have undergone rapid development in recent years to meet the increasing needs of high-speed cordless connections in civil and military applications. In a wireless environment, the disclosure of a mobile user's identity allows unauthorized entities to track his/her moving history and current location. This results in a compromise of the individual's privacy [1] and potentially increases other risks of exploitation. Arguably, anonymity characteristics should be a feature to be considered in the design of wireless communications technologies. To provide anonymity service for wireless communications, Zhu and Ma proposed a new and efficient authentication scheme in which mobile users are allowed to perform only symmetric encryption and decryption operations [1] . Lee et al., however, showed that Zhu-Ma's scheme is insecure and proposed an enhanced scheme to withstand identified weaknesses [2] . More recently in 2008, Wu et al. pointed out that Lee et al. ' s enhanced scheme also fails to provide anonymity as claimed and then proposed a simple fix [3] . In this paper, we use Wu et al.'s scheme as a case study and demonstrate that due to an inherent design flaw in Zhu-Ma's scheme, the latter and its successors are unlikely to provide user anonymity. We hope that by identifying this design flaw, similar structural mistakes can be avoided in future designs. [3] consists of three phases: initial phase, first phase, and second phase. We briefly depict them in the following (the notations involved are listed in Table I ).
A. Initial phase
When a new mobile user (MU) wants to register at his/her home agent (HA), he/she submits his/her identity ID MU to the HA. Then HA delivers MU's password P W MU and a smart card, which contains ID HA , r, and h, to MU through a secure channel. The P W MU and r are calculated as follows:
where N is a secret value kept by HA.
B. First phase
In this phase, the foreign agent (FA) authenticates MU and issues a temporary certificate to MU as follows, where the statement {A → B : M } denotes that B receives a message M from A.
is his/her temporary key, and x 0 and x are two secret random numbers. A timestamp T MU is also selected by MU to prevent from replay attacks.
Step 2.
FA passes the information received from MU with a certificate Cert F A , a secret random number b, and the corresponding signature E SFA (h(b, n, C, T MU , Cert F A ) ) to HA. Step 3.
HA computes the ciphertext
and its signature E SHA (h(b, c, W, Cert HA )), where c is a secret random number generated by HA.
Step 4. FA → MU: (T Cert MU ||h(x 0 ||x)) k With the response from HA, FA decrypts W with its secret key to obtain h(h (N ||ID MU ) ), x 0 , and x. The session key k = h(h(h(N ||ID MU ))||x||x 0 ) between FA and MU is derived accordingly.
Upon receiving the message from FA, MU computes the session key k, and then decrypts (T Cert MU ||h(x 0 ||x)) k to obtain the temporary certificate T Cert MU .
C. Second phase
When MU visits FA at ith session, MU sends the following messages to FA:
The new ith session key k i can be derived from the unexpired previous secret knowledge x i−1 and the fixed secret x as
Upon receiving messages from MU, FA decrypts (x i ||T Cert MU ||OtherInf ormation) ki and saves x i for the next communication.
III. ANONYMITY OF WU et al.'S SCHEME
We now demonstrate that both Wu et al.'s scheme [3] and its predecessors [1] , [2] are unable to preserve user anonymity as claimed: an attacker who has registered as a user of HA, as shown in Fig. 1 , can obtain the identity of other users as long as they registered at the same HA.
Assume that A is an attacker who has registered at some HA, then he/she can derive P W A , ID HA , r, and h from the HA (see Sec. II-A), where
Consequently, A is able to compute h(N ||ID HA ):
Let MU be a mobile user who is registered at the same HA and is running the first phase with some FA. It is obvious that A can intercept ID HA and n = h(N ||ID HA ) ⊕ ID HA ⊕ ID MU (see Eq. (1)) from Step 1 because wireless is broadcast in nature and anyone within range of a wireless device can intercept the packets being sent out without interrupting the flow of data [1] . Next, A can confirm that MU is a user of HA based on ID HA and determine the identity of MU by executing the XOR operation to n, ID HA , and h(N ||ID HA ). That is, A is able to compute
The above attack shows that it is trivial for an attacker to obtain the identity of mobile users and defeat the (claimed) anonymity service provided by Wu et al.'s scheme. Especially, if the attacker colludes with the FA, then FA can know the identity of all mobile users who shared the same HA with the attacker and are communicating with it.
Since Zhu-Ma's and Lee et al.'s schemes have the same initial phase as Wu et al.'s scheme, and the same messages n and ID HA need to be sent from MU to FA during Step 1 of the first phase (see [1] , [2] ), it is clear that the above attack is also applicable to the two schemes which causes them to fail in achieving the anonymity service too.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We pointed out an inherent design flaw in the scheme of Zhu and Ma (2004) , which enables an attacker registered as a user of some home agent (HA) to obtain the identity of other users registered with the same HA without authorization. As a result, we recommend that none of these three schemes identified in this paper should be deployed for real world applications and hope that by identifying this design flaw, similar structural mistakes can be avoided in future designs.
